On modeling of expert knowledge and admissibility of uncertainly measures  by Nguyen, Hung T.
ON MODELING OF EXPERT-KNOWLEDGE AND ADMISSIBILITY 
OF UNCERTAINTY MEASURES 
Hung T. Nguyen* 
Department of Mathematical Sciences 
New Mexico State University, Las Cruces. NM 88003 - USA 
Abstract. This paper addresses the problem of modeling of expert knowledge 
as a starting point for inference analysis in uncertain knowledge-based 
systems. The experts’ opinions in a given problem are viewed as additional 
information in cognitive decision processes. Depending upon which 
uncertainty measures are used in expert knowledge representation, different 
inferential engines will be proposed. The flow from data to decisions will 
be examined in order to help the design of intelligent systems. In 
considering various types of uncertainty measures, the problem of 
admissibility will he addressed. 
X=vword 6. Bayesian updating, expert knowledge. inferential engines, 
knowledge-based systems. posslbilitv. 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this communication is 
to illustrate the flow of knowledge 
from perception to evaluation in the 
design of knowledge-based systems. 
First, we will look at a traditional 
way Of node1 ing experts’ opinions 
us3ng subjective probabilities and 
Bayes ’ formula as an inferential 
engine. We us0 an example from 
plausible reasoning to emphasize the 
role of uncertainty measures or 
degrees of belief in deriving logical 
reasoning processes. In the spirit of 
mult.iple--conclusion logic. we discuss 
an other inferential engine in 
cognitive decision processes. Next, 
we discirss a problem of modeling and 
inference using possibility theory. 
Finally, as far as uncertainty 
measures are concerned, we address the 
problem of their admissibility. 
the calculus of probabilities to carry 
out the above translation. Indeed, we 
have : 
P(AnB) = P(AlB)P(B) = P(HIA)P(A). 
But since B is a sub-hypothesis of 
A, we have 
P(BiA) = 1 
and, on the other hand, 0 < P(B)< 1. 
we infer that 
P(A(BI 1 P(A). 
This example illustrates the following 
points: 
(1) When the evidence in the 
knowledge base is uncertain or 
imprecise, a degree of credibility or 
belief is often assigned to it 
subjectively, say hy experts. 
BAYESIAN UPDATING 
Let us start out by an example from 
the logic of plausible reasoning (see 
e.g. Polya, IYfXl) Let A be a 
hypothesis or a mathematical 
conjecture. Suppose that B is a 
sub-hypothesis of A. Since A is 
uncertain. we might express our belief 
in the truth of A by a number C(A). 
NOW. if we know that B turns out to 
be true, we would like to modify C(A) 
into C(AlB) in such a way that 
C(A)Bl > C(A). That is to say we want 
to translate the statement “knowing 
that B is true, A becomes more 
credible” in a consist.c!nt manner. If 
there is no objection. (see an 
interesting comment of Bellman. 3978. 
about this attitude). let us regard 
our degree of belief C(A) as the 
probability of A, say P(A). where P 
stands for any possible interpretation 
of the concept of probability. By 
, doing so, we now have at our disposal 
(ii) The nature of the uncertainty 
measure considered is of important, 
since not only it reflects the 
uncertainty modeling of experts, but 
also each uncertainty. which satisfies 
some set of axioms. will have its own 
associated calculus. 
(iii) The associated calculus of an 
uncertainty measure provides the basic 
tools for discovering logical rules 
underlying the reasoning process. 
(See also the Interesting work of 
.Jaynes, 1958, concerning plausible 
reasoning, confirmation and weight of 
evidence in the context of the robot.) 
Let US continue to assume that 
probability can be thought OP as the 
mathematical language of uncertainty. 
In a decision framework. say, for 
expert systems. the decision maker can 
utilize all available information, 
including experts’ knowledge, in order 
to reduce the amount. of uncertainty 
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present in a decjsion-making problem. 
A typical problem In t.hr probabjlistic 
approach to knowledge-based systems is 
the problem of updating prior belief 
in the light of experts’ Opinions. 
(See e.g. Morris. 1977; French. 1980: 
Genest and Shervish, 1985.) 
Specifically, let A be an uncertain 
event. Subjectively, the decision 
maker has a prior belief in A which 
is expressed as the probability of A. 
say p = P(A). Now if there are k 
experts who are willing to reveal 
their opinions about A. the decision- 
maker would like to take into account 
of these opinions in order to update 
his belief in A. Of course, in the 
Bayesian spirit, he would think about 
using Bayes ’ formula as an engine for 
updating procedure. In order to be 
able to use Bayes’ formula. he has to 
assume a lot of things in his modeling 
scheme. First, expert knowledge is 
treated as random variables. so that 
the probability that thu i-th expert 
will assign to A is a random 
variable Q, : (R3.P) + [0.1] (Second 
order probabilities). Given that 
Pi = 91’ i = l.Z....,k. the posterior 
probability of A can be expressed 
formally as 
P* = P(Al(Q,,Q,, . . ..Q.) = 
(ql*q2,.,,,qk)) = 
P(A)P((Q1.Q2,...,Qk) = 
(qI,q2....* qk)lA)P((Ql,Qz,....Qk) = 
(Y,,Y,,.... qk3). 
In the most realistic cases (see 
Genest and Schervish, 1985), the 
decision maker might not need to 
“sprclfy” the joint distribution of 
(Q,. . . . . Qk), but only needs to know 
the expectation of the Qi’s. i.e. 
pi 
= E(Qi), i : 1.2, .,., k. In this 
case, it can be shown that p* is Of 
k 
the form 
p +,~lVq’ - pj), (a form 
of linear opjnion pool). where Al 
are appropriate constants. The above 
modeling process rests essentially in 
the assumption that uncertainty arld 
knowledge (as expressed by numerical 
values) are treatc?d as (subjective) 
probability and realizations of random 
variables, respectively. The updating 
engine is based upon Bayes’ formula in 
the spirit of Bayesian statistics, 
with its USA of subjective 
probabilities. The price we have to 
pay in order to arrive at a rigorous 
formula for p* is the assunpt ion 
that we will be able to specify the 
mean values p. 
1’ i =1.2. . . . . K of 
the experts. (The qi’s are. of 
course. to be revealed to us.) Thus 
mani questions of validity and of 
applicability to practical situations 
are raised. 
TO see that there exist other 
frameworks which seem more appropriate 
for behavioral decision-making, 
consider the following situation 
(which has a broader interpretation 
and hence is more realistic for 
applications): suppose WC have n 
premises A,, . . . . An and some of the 
conclusions among B1.B2, . . . . BID Call 
follow from the AiTS (wine 
multiple-conclusion logic. see 
Shoesmlth and Smiley. 1960). In other 
words, the truth lies somewhere among 
the Bl’S. The set (BI ,B2, , B,& 
can be regarded as an ordinary set or 
a generalized set in the sense that 
the membership or possibility of each 
Bi 
is a number n(Bi) e [O,l], where 
n(B1) is assigned subjectively by the 
decision maker and expresses the 
belief of the decision maker in the 
truth of BI. The case of total 
ignorance corresponds to a uniform 
distribution. Consider the set 
(BI.B2. s Bm) conditional on 
Al, , An as his prior belief on 
the location of the true conclusion. 
the decison maker can update his 
belief af tar seeking experts’ 
knowledge. Suppose k experts are 
asked to reveal their judgment on the 
true conclusion. and expert 1 
assigned the set Si 
as the set of 
conclusion which should contain the 
true conclusion. I” this case, 
experts’ knowledge can be treated as 
random or possibilistic sets. In such 
a modeling scheme, a plausible rule 
for updating the prior belief is: 
k 
n sin (Bl,B2, . . . . Hm) 
i=l 
Note that any decision based upon such 
an inferential engine wills give rise 
to a type of error (risk). namely 
reaching a conclusion in the reduced 
set of conclusions when the true one 
lies outside of that set. This 
framework is consistent with 
statistical theory of information in 
the sense that the information of 
localization is a decreasing function 
of the probability of “ccurence. The 
above plausible rule of updating 
bellef is somewhat simjlar to the 
so-called Dempster’s rule of 
combination. Indeed, using the 
concept of belief functions (Shaf ar , 
1976). the decision rule is based upon 
the following rule of combination of 
evidence. For two independent random 
sets s1 and S2 (that is, random 
sets s 1 and S2 with P(SI = A, 
S2 = B) = P(S1 = A)P(S2 = B)), let 
s = s, l-l s2 (conditional on SI fl S2 
f 0). i.e. 
P(S = A) = 
P(S,nS, = A) 
P(SlnS2 f 0) 
Denote by He11 and Be12 the belief 
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functions associated with the random 
sets s 
1’ 3 
respectively. where 
Bell(A) = P(Si 5 A), then &II @ 
Bela, the belief function associated 
with s = s, l-l S2’ is called‘- the 
Deapster’s rule of combination. 
A POSSIBILISTIC UPDATING EXAMPLE 
Depending upon the context, experts’ 
knowledge can be modeled by different 
types of uncertainty measures such as 
certainty factor in MYCIN (Shortliffe 
and Buchanan, 1975), weight of 
evidence (Spiegelhalter and Knill- 
Jones, 1984) possibility distributions 
(Zadeb. 1978). For an encompassing 
t.beory of uncertainty measures 
together with their representation in 
terms of random sets, see Goodman and 
Nguyen e 1985. We present now a 
problem of inference using possibjlity 
theory. 
First, recall that by random sets we 
nw?an random elements whose possible 
outcones are subsets of some given 
space. Specifically. extending random 
vectors, which are special cases of 
random sets with values singletons in 
Rome finite dimensional Euclidean 
*pace, one defines random sets as 
follows. 
Let (I2,r.P) be a probability space 
and IJ be an arbitrary set. Let t 
be a subset of P(U), the power set of 
U. and Le a a-field on Y. A random 
set S on U is a mapping from II 
to K. which is measurable with 
respect to s and ‘E. The 
probability distribution of S is 
simply the induced probability measure 
POS-I on (U,G) as in standard 
Kolaogorov framework of probability 
theory. Note that the theory of 
random sets and its applications to 
statistical inference. for example to 
spatial statistics, is a subject of 
current research interest. 
Next, we will base our analysis in a 
general framework known as general 
logical system (see Goodman and 
Nguyen, 198.5). that is R triple of 
logical connectors (not, and, or) and 
a dispersion map from the category 
SET to SET. These logical connectors 
will be evaluated semantically using 
families of truth functions such as 
negation operators, t-norms, and 
t-conorms illustrated below (where 
II.11 denotes a semantic evaluation). 
a) For ordinary semantic evaluation: 
Ilnotll (x) = I - x 
llandll (x.y) = x A y 
(minimum of x and y) 
Ilorll (x,y) = x v y 
(maximum of x and y). 
b) Other possible evaluations are: 
a l/2 
llnotll (x) = (1 - x ) 
forsome a>O. 
llnotll (x) = 3 if x = 0 
=o if O<X<l. 
cl Examples of t-norms are: 
llendll (x.y) = xy 
llandll (x,yl = max (x + y -. I, 0) 
Ilandll (x.y) = x A Y. 
d) Bxamples of t-conorms are: 
llorll (x,y) = x V Y 
1101‘11 (x.y) = 1 - (1 - x)(1 - Y) 
Ilorll (x.y) = min(x + y. I). 
Let 9 c s(u). a t-possibility 
measure . . a 
I? : 3-b VJ.,:; 
set-rllnct ion 
soch that P iS 
monotone and 
” A,B E %. n(MB) = J?(A) + n(B) - 
t@(A), n(B) 
where t is a distributive t-norm 
(WA write t = PL with P denoting 
the membership function). In 
particular, Zadeh ’ s poasibillty 
rOt?SS”PB II(B) = sup f(x). where 
xen 
f : u + [o.I] is called a possibility 
distribution. Note that more 
generally, a possibility measure n 
can be represented as 8(A) * 
sup(P(A), P E P). where 9 is a 
collection of probability meas”rPS 
(Giles, 1982). In inference analysis. 
we need the concept of conditional 
possibility. For A E ?(vXV). and 
8 E F(U). we have: 
ll(y E Alx E B)) I (X E B)ll = 
Il(x.y) E All 
i.e., assuming truth functionality. 
P&l(P(,,,,B))(Y). PB(X)l = PA(X.Y) 
The u-projection of A is defined 
as: 
(P (X,Y). ‘Proj,,(A) = ‘01. ,A 
YGV 
The two projections proju(A) v 
proj,(A) are said to be 
non-interactive if f: 
A = proju(A) x proj,(A). 
When P& = A and Par = V. we have: 
P(A(xcB)(Y) * FB(X) = PA(X.Y) 
Pproj 
U 
(A)(x) = SUP PA(X.Y) 
YaV 
pA(x’y) = Pproju(A)(X) A PprojV(A)(Y). 
An explicit form for P(AlxeB)(Y) is 
given by: 
P(A(xoB)(Y) = PA(X.Y) if 
Pproju(A)(X) ’ ‘~roj,(A+~) 
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_ P*(X,Y) P 
projv(*)(Y)rPprojo(A)(X) 
‘f Pproj,,(*)(X) ’ yprojV(A)(Y)’ 
Now if Y is a random variable. 
defined on the probability space 
(R,T,P), with probability distribntion 
Py on U. and X is a fuzzy variable 
taking values in V depending on Y 
in the following way: given that 
Y = y. the strict range of X is seine 
subset T 
Y 
of V. Thus 
1 if xaT 
lr(X = XlY = y) = 
{ 
Y 
0 otherwise 
and R(X(Y = y) = PT or nlort? 
Y 
generally A(XIY) = ylT y where o is 
0 
a functional composition. If we 
identify PY with (Y .Py) and T 
with n(XlY) I we can regard as 
evidence the pair & = (P Y’ ?r(XjY)). 
Note that n(XjY = y) is a random set 
in V. 
It is easy to see that: 
R(X)Y = y) = 6 - T -0 
Y 
AC_ V, An Ty f 0 - A n n(XlY - y) 
#O 
Ty F A c) n(XjY = y) C A. 
Therefore P*(A) = P[n(XlY) 5 A] 
P*(A) = P[n(XlY) fl A # 01 
* 
where P,,P are lower and upper 
probabilities associated with (n.+,P) 
and the multi-valued mapping 
The random set R(XlY = y) 
n(x)Y). 
inducas a 
possibility measure defined by: 
n(X 6 AIY = y) = 
sup(n(X = xjY = y),x a A) 
or a random possibility measure: 
n(x E A(Y) = 
( 
1 if AI-lTyf+ 
0 otherwise 
Note that EY(n(x a AlY) = P*(A) 
where SY 
denotes probabilistic 
expectation with respect to the random 
variable Y. 
-: If we “se the concept. of 
conditional probability spaces (Renyi, 
1970)) then possibility distributions 
can be regarded as generalized 
probability densities. Moreover, 
since possibility distribut.i”ns are 
bounded functions. they can be 
identified with Schwartz tempered 
distributions. and hence they possess 
Fourier transforms (in the sanse of 
distribu1jons) (see NguyRo. 1985). 
AI)MISSIHILITY OF UNCl3UAINTY 
MEASUHES 
In considering various uncertainty 
measures for modal ing expert 
know1 edge, one might face the 
following quest ion: are there 
specific conparisons showing one class 
of uncertainty measures is “better” 
than another? Our previous theme has 
been : each situation dictates a 
perhaps different appropriate 
uncertainty lneasure for mod~:l ing 
purpose. In the’ following. we will 
invest igate thrx above question in the 
framework of statistical decision 
theory. We will base “UP analysts on 
Llndley’s paper (Lindley. 1982) which 
generalizes Savage’s earlier work 
(Savage. 1971). see also Goodman and 
Nguyen , l!lSS 
First, lot us set up a rigorous 
framework in which uncertainty 
measures can be regarded as decision 
functions relative to event sequences 
by using additive SCOI’BS. Let (X.d) 
be a measurable space and T(A) = 
(&Cd. t at most countable). We 
t.ake 8 =Xx7(A) as the parameter 
space. Let. I be the interval Ia.bl 
of Al (recall that an oncertalnty 
measure nn (X.A) can be considered 
as a map from A to I.), we define 
the space of actions by 3 = 
(h : t + 1. where C E 7(A)). To 
define loss functions, we introduce 
the following class of sC”rR 
functions: 
+ 
3! = (f : I x (0.1) -tR , 
f satisfies (1)) 
(I) Regularlty condition: v t B 
(0.1). x + f(x.t) is of class CI 
over the interior of I; there exist 
CI and p with a < P. in the 
interior of I, such that: 
g- (x.0) < 0 for x < cl. 
G(a.0) = 0. and +$x.0) > 0 
for x > c%: -$(x.1) < 0 for 
for x<p, $ f(p.l) = 0 and 
k f(x.1) > 0 for x > p. 
FOI- f l *, the associated loss 
function is 
Lf 
: exr+nz+, B = (x,&).h: t’ -+ I, 
Lf(G.h) = 
1 
Z f(h(A).I,(x)) if C=C’ 
AeC’ 
100 if C#E’ 
(where 
IA 
: x -4 (0.1) denotes the 
membership function of A). 
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Finally, the data space is defined to 
be: 
Y = (g(A))AEE, g : A -. -4, C E 7(n)) 
and the space of decision functions is 
defined to be some subset 
‘oc (T : V-bto). Note that one can 
write. for Y e Y, T(Y) = (rA(g(A))AaE 
where r,(g(A)) represents the 
uncertainty of the event A given 
g(A) is observed to occur. so that 
T : Y-9 is a conditional 
uncertainty measure map: (rig)(t) ” 
(rA(g(A))AaE. We say that T : SJ -. 2~ 
is admissible with respect to f (in 
a) if there is no +’ : Y - ID such 
that 
(2) Lf(r’(y),9) 5 Lf(7(y),a) for all 
e E e. with strict Inequality holding 
for at least some e. 
For f E JI. define the transform Pf : 
[a’ .b’] -, [O.l] (where [a’.b’ C_ I) 
as follows: 
$(x,0) 
P,(X) = 
+,oj - +.I) 
One of the main results of Lindley, 
1982. is this: if I is admissible 
(with respect to f), then there 
exists a probability measure Q on 
(X,.4) such that: 
(3) Pf(TA(g(A)) = Q(A(U.4)). As a 
consequence. a number of well-known 
classes of uncertainty mPas”res - 
including confidence intervals. upper 
probabilities. possibility measures - 
are not admissible (since these 
measures do not satisfy (3) which is a 
necessary condition for 
admissibility.) However, Lindley did 
not test t.he admissibility of the 
class Of (conditional) probability 
measures (except the trivial case when 
P,(X) 7 x). The answer is negative in 
general ! Note that all uncertainty 
measures can be extended to 
probability measures over higher order 
spaces which. in turn, are all 
admissible! FOP more detail, see 
Goodman and Nguyen. 1985. 
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